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Summary 
The Self-Protection Electronic Warfare (SPEW) Manager is an automated system that provides 
a link between the electronic warfare sensors and actors, available in an aircraft. It determines 
the most effective actions and, if possible, executes those actions. We developed a SPEW 
Manager, in which the feasibility of the concept has to be proven in a demonstration 
environment. The SPEW Manager demonstrator consists of a simulated sensor data fusion 
module, a resource manager and a human-machine interface. It is highly flexible with respect to 
aircraft type and available actors. Facilities to take both hardware-initiated and crew-initiated 
actor activation into account are added. Various operational and system modes are supported. 
The SPEW Manager demonstration will improve the effectiveness and efficiency of using 
countermeasures against threats. 
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Abstract 
The Self-Protection Electronic Warfare 
(SPEW) Manager is an automated system 
that provides a link between the electronic 
warfare sensors and actors, available in an 
aircraft. It determines the most effective 
actions and, if possible, executes those 
actions. We developed a SPEW Manager, in 
which the feasibility of the concept has to be 
proven in a demonstration environment. The 
SPEW Manager demonstrator consists of a 
simulated sensor data fusion module, a 
resource manager and a human-machine 
interface. It is highly flexible with respect to 
aircraft type and available actors. Facilities to 
take both hardware-initiated and crew- 
initiated actor activation into account are 
added. Various operational and system 
modes are supported. The SPEW Manager 
demonstration will improve the effectiveness 
and efficiency of using countermeasures 
against threats. 
1 Introduction 
A Self-Protection Electronic Warfare 
(SPEW) Manager determines the most 
effective use of actors to counter detected 
threats. Such a manager enables co-ordinated 
countermeasures that can not be performed 
manually using the separate systems [l]. 
Most notably, this involves countermeasures 
combining jamming and chaff. Furthermore, 
the manager can apply countermeasures to 
counter more than one threat simultaneously. 
Under a contract awarded by the Royal 
Netherlands Air Force, the National 
Aerospace Laboratory NLR and its sub- 
contractor TNO are carrying out applied 
research and development into a SPEW 
Manager. This shall result in a 
demonstration in a realistic simulation 
environment, proving the feasibility of the 
manager. 
In this paper, we will describe the 
architecture, components and techniques of 
the SPEW Manager. 
2 The SPEW Manager 
2.1 Architecture 
The SPEW Manager is developed using the 
Shlaer/Mellor (S/M) Object-Oriented 
Analysis and Design method [2][31. The S/M 
Object Communications Model for the 
SPEW Manager is depicted in figure I ,  and 
is used here to describe the manager. 
The SPEW Manager consists of three 
distinctive parts. These are the white boxes 
in the figure. The first part contains the 
multi-sensor data fusion (MSDF) 
functionality. Hcre, based on data obtained 
from various sensors on-board the aircraft, 
combined with intelligence information, a 
list of threats is constructed. The second part 
of the SPEW manager is called the Resource 
Manager (RM). Here, a combination of 
countermeasures is determined, optimally 
countering the threats in the threat list. The 
third part is the Human Machine Interface 
(HMI), which informs the crew on the 
situation and which visualises suggestions to 
counter the threats. 
For the demonstration, the SPEW Manager is 
embedded in a simulation environment. This 
is the dark box in figure 1: the Interactive 
Tactical Environment Management System 
(ITEMS) from CAE Electronics (41. 
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Dithered boxes outside the Resource 
Manager box in figure 1 denote interface 
objects, used to transfer and convert the 
necessary data between parts. 
We will discuss the three parts of the SPEW 
Manager in more detail in the following 
sections. 
2.2 Multi-sensor data fusion 
The MSDF part of the SPEW Manager 
acquires the information about the threats. 
Furthermore, for each threat, it determines 
lethality to enable prioritisation of the 
threats. The constructed list of threats may 
include inaccurate information (for instance 
in the aspect angle with regard to the 
ownship). It may involve incomplete 
information (for instance the range to the 
threat can not be determined) and uncertain 
information (like: we do not know for certain 
whether a threat is of type A or of type B). 
The actual conversion of raw sensor data into 
a threat list is not the goal of the project, and 
is therefore simulated. For each detected 
threat, the following information is provided: 
Attribute I Exnlumtion 
Threat level 
Position 
Velocity 
Identification 
Certainty 
TT1 
Threat mode 
Unique name of the threat 
Lethahty, ranging from 1 to 10 
Position, relative to owiiship 
(range, anmuth, elevation) 
Speed vector 
Threat type, which can vary 
between very detatled (SAM8) and 
a rough classification (IK m i w l c ~ )  
Probability ot identification being 
correct 
Time Till Intercept (lor missiles) 
If applicable, the mode in which 
the threat’s radar is in Sezch, 
The threat level is determined based on 
acquired expert knowledge, and can depend 
on e.g., position of the threat. These values 
are easily adaptable, to allow fine-tuning of 
the SPEW Manager. 
Note, that when identification of a threat is 
ambiguous, e.g., when we assume there is 
70% probability of the threat being of type A ,  
and 30% probability of the threat being of 
type B, the MSDF process results in two 
threats: one of type A and one of type B. This 
way of solving the ambiguity problem is 
necessary for reasons of safety: one cannot 
neglect perhaps fatal possibilities. 
2.3 Resource manager 
In the Resource Manager box (see figure 1) 
countering the threats is handled. Various 
parts can be distinguished. We will discuss 
them here. 
2.3.1 System and crew 
The System-and-crew box in figure 1 refers 
to the ownship systems, including the crew. 
Next to RCMs and CMs from a CMT, 
countermeasures can be initiated directly by 
the crew. The SPEW manager takes these 
into account, and will never abort or prohibit 
the execution of such a countermeasure. 
When prioritising the various types of 
countermeasures, we see that crew-initiated 
countermeasures have the highest priority, 
followed by RCMs and CMs from a CMT. 
The SPEW Manager supports operational 
modes. Based on characteristics of the 
environment, the crew is able to select 
various preferences, with regard to the use of 
expendables, jamming and manoeuvres. 
Built-in preferences include Constrained 
manoeuvring, in which manoeuvres are 
applied as little as possible, Minimum 
expendable use, when for tactical or political 
reasons the use of expendables should be 
constrained, and Run silent, when jamming is 
unwanted. Furthermore, the SPEW Manager 
supports various system modes, controlling 
the level of automation. These are 08, Stand- 
By, Manual, Semi-automatic and Fully 
Automatic. The HMI supports the selection 
of these modes during flight. 
2.3.2 CMT Knowledge Base 
To counter a threat, obtained from the MSDF 
process, a sequence of countermeasures 
(CMs) can be executed. These sequences are 
called countermeasure techniques (CMTs), 
and consist of tactics (manoeuvres), 
techniques (chaff, flare, jamming) or 
-6- 
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combinations of these. All of these CMTs are 
aimed at minimising threat lethality, i.e., 
deny or delay lock-on during search, break 
lock during track, or cause a launched 
missile to miss. A threat that, thanks to 
executed CMTs, goes from track mode back 
to search mode is considered to disappear, 
and another, new threat appears instead: the 
same physical threat but in search mode, 
probably with a lower threat level. 
I 4 c  
Extensive knowledge acquisition using 
expert interviews and trial results has 
resulted in a representative and large set of 
rules, connecting generic descriptions of 
CMTs to generic threat descriptions under 
specified conditions. Further more, 
estimations of the effectiveness of the CMT 
against the threat are supplied. Again, these 
estimations are easily adaptable for fine- 
tuning. 
The following table shows a generic example 
of some of the knowledge, from which the 
rules are distilled. 
ID I Thrt I Mde I TL I Sens I E l  GCMT 
1 1 SAMl I S 1 3  I R  1 5 1  OT 
,..A. ,._ ~uiul)lTION: None 
# Simple example: SAMl search radar (low TL) 
CONDITION: None 
# As above, only now the site is also detected by the 
ALQ, so jamming can be used (Noise). 
12 I SAMl I T 1 4  I R+J 1 8 1  RGPOlC+ 
and chaff is effective, but only at certain azimuth angles 
32 I SAMl I L I 9 I R+J+ I 81 VGPO1 
CONDITION: Time Till Intercept25s 
34 I SAMl I L I 10 I R+J+ I 5 I 6Gturnlnto 
I I I \ M A  I I 
CONDITION: Time Till Intercepk5s 
I # Missile is launched, detected by MAWS. Assuming I 
semi-active missile, VGPO can be attempted. If this 
fails (TTkSs), perform last ditch manoeuvre 
level, the sensors that detected it, the 
expected effectiveness of the proposed 
countermeasure technique, the type of 
technique itself, and on the next line the 
condition under which the technique is 
effective. 
A condition in a rule can have the following 
form: 
aspect angle between lower bound and 
upper bound; 
altitude between lower bound and upper 
bound; 
0 speed between lower bound and upper 
bound; 
G-level between lower bound and upper 
bound; 
time till intercept between lower bound 
and upper bound. 
Each countermeasure in a technique is 
accompanied by a starting time and a 
finishing time, allowing exact timing of 
CMs. These time stamps are determined 
based on the relative position of the threat. 
In figure 2, the S/M object model of the 
SPEW Manager is supplied. This is an 
object-oriented model, showing the relations 
between concepts within the Manager. The 
representation of the rules can be found in 
the bottom left corner. There, we can see that 
a CMTRule object connects a Threat object 
to a Generic Counter Measure Technique 
object (GCMT), which of its turn consists of 
Generic Planned Counter Measure objects 
(GPCM). 
The set of rules forms the core of the SPEW 
Manager. It is an easy-to-modify text-based 
file. This enables the application of the 
SPEW Manager in different aircraft, based 
on the available actors. Furthermore, new 
CMTs can be added. 
From left to right, we see the unique ID of 
the rule, the type of the threat, the threat 
-7- 
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MSDF-RM 
~ 
t + 
RESOURCE MANAGER 
RCM Activator CMT Scheduler System 
RCM KB CMT KB 
ITEMS-RM 1‘
Figure 1. Object Communication Model of the SPEW manager 
2.3.3 RCM Knowledge Base 
In various current aircraft configurations, 
certain sensors are directly wired to actors 
like chaff and flare. This enables the actor to 
react immediately on sensor input by 
executing a so-called reflex countermeasure 
(RCM). These are activated only in case of 
imminent danger, e.g., the detection of an 
incoming missile, for which crew actions 
would come too late, and a flare is ejected 
automatically. The SPEW manager is able to 
(a) take these reflex countermeasures into 
account by simulating them in software, and 
(b) extend the set of reflex countermeasures 
in software by the addition of reflex rules. 
These connect certain sensor data 
characteristics directly to actions to be 
executed, under certain conditions. These 
reflex rules are activated based on sensor 
tracks, and not on threats. The RCMs require 
that the Resource Manager is not only 
provided with the fused threat data, but also 
all newly discovered tracks, to be able to see 
whether an RCM should be activated. Hence, 
in the simulation of the data fusion process, 
next to threat information, new tracks have to 
be supplied. 
In the development of the SPEW manager, 
knowledge acquisition has resulted in an 
extensive list of reflex rules. Figure 2 shows 
the representation in the dashed objects in the 
down right corner. As with the rules 
discussed in paragraph 2.3.1, this set is easily 
modifiable. The activation of reflex 
countermeasures can disturb the execution of 
“normal” countermeasures. This is taken into 
account in the Manager. 
2.3.4 CMT Scheduler 
The CMT scheduler determines what actions 
to schedule to counter the detected threats. In 
section 3, we will get into this process i n  
more detail. 
2.3.5 RCM Activator 
The RCM scheduler examines the new 
sensor tracks as supplied by the MSDF 
process, and determines whether or not an 
RCM has to be activated. This is done by 
checking the conditions as supplied in the set 
of reflex rules. If one of the conditions is 
fulfilled, the accompanying RCM is 
activated, but only if crew actions do not 
prevent this. 
-8- 
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R 015 influences 
I I I . .  . . . . 
I I 
__ 
Threal R002 CMT 
IS countered by 
A 
R013 'CMiRule- 1 PCM 
44: : z : 
I 
. . .  
R 014 
influences 
activates ayrack- - - - 
C 
~ C 
Actor RCM 
IS triggered by '- - - - - - 
. . - . . .  
I 
,ReflexRule j 
RO09 I 
IS activated by 
I IS an example of 
1 activates - - - ' K 008 
I has adverse effects on 
c f  
m v e r i e  ActorTypel 
Figure 2. The SPEW Manager S/M Object model 
2.4 Human-Machine Interface 
The SPEW Manager adds an advanced 
colour threat display to the cockpit, from 
which the crew can select one of three views. 
The first is a list of detected threats. The 
second is a chase view of these threats, and 
the third is a god's eye view of the threat 
situation. The latter is shown in figure 3 (in 
reverse video, for clarity of presentation). 
On the top left, the system mode of the 
SPEW Manager is displayed. In this case, 
this is automatic (AUTO). On top, the 
current jammer mode (XMTl), and the 
number of expendables available (40 chaff 
cartridges: C40 and 50 flares: F50) is 
displayed. On the top right, we see the 
operational mode (Run Silent: SLNT) in 
which the manager is running. 
The ownship is displayed, accompanied by 
its flight plan. Detected threats are displayed 
within coloured circles denoting their range: 
each threat has its own colour. Friendly 
entities are shown in green. On the bottom, a 
time line displays the planned CMTs, in the 
colour of the threat they counter. These 
planned CMTs move from right to left (t=O): 
when a countermeasure is at the left, its 
execution will start. 
We see that the first CM planned is J1: a 
jamming action. After that, ejecting chaff C 
and three more jamming actions J2,J3 and J4 
are scheduled. 
-9- 
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Figure 3. God's eye view of the threat situation 
3 Countering the threats be executed immediately, we have two 
3.1 Scheduling choices: 
Threat levels accompany threats. It is 
obvious, that threats with a high threat level 
(i.e., lethal threats) have higher priority than 
lower-level threats. 
When we have selected a CMT for use any scheduling, only selection. 
Schedule it and execute it at a later time; 
Do not counter the threat now, but wait 
until the actors that cause the conflict are 
released. Thus, this approach does not 
' 
countering a threat, it may be possible that 
the CMT can not be executed immediately 
because either the actors it needs are 
occupied, or currently prcsent threats 
prohibit the use of certain CMs that have 
negative effects on them (the so-called 
adverse effects). These negative effects are 
known to the scheduling process: they are 
supplied in a text file. When the CMT cannot 
If we choose the first approach, we assume 
that we know what the threat and actor 
situation looks like in the near future, and 
thus which CMT is the best at that time, or 
whether a CMT can be executed at all. We 
can optimise the use of assets in the near 
future. The second approach has the 
disadvantage that no optimal use of assets 
can be guaranteed, but it has an important 
-10- 
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advantage: there is no need to predict the 
future. Whereas, in the first approach, CMTs, 
scheduled in the future, may become sub- 
optimal, obsolete or impossible due to (1) 
changes in the threat situation, (2) changes in 
actor availability or ( 3 )  changes in relative 
positions, the second approach only 
considers the present situation. 
We did develop algorithms for both 
approaches. The one, using the first 
approach, was based on branch-and-bound 
[ 5 ]  and showed promising experimental 
results. However, based on the 
considerations as mentioned above, for the 
(first) demonstration we chose the second, 
more down-to-earth approach. 
3.2 Selection of rules 
For each possible threat object, we made sure 
that at least one rule describing which 
generic CMT can be chosen to counter the 
threat with this vector. We assume that for 
threats that cannot be identified in detail, 
more generic identifications can be found, 
for which rules exist. 
A rule contains a condition specifying 
whether the rule is applicable or not, based 
on the type of threat, and the relative position 
of it. Operational mode constraints can be 
present in these conditions as well. However, 
when lethal threats are present, we do want 
to be able to select these CMTs if no other 
CMTs are available. That is why CMTs that 
are not allowed to occur, considering the 
current operational mode, may still be chosen 
when a lethal threat is detected. 
Since all elements influenced by the 
operational mode constraints: manoeuvres, 
chaff, flares and jammer actions, are all CM 
types, we simply check the operational mode 
when selecting a CMT and we try not to 
choose CMTs containing these CMs. 
However, if there is no alternative for 
countering the threat (there are no other 
CMTs available) and the threat level of the 
threat is high, we ‘override’ the operational 
mode. The notion “high” is configurable 
within the SPEW Manager, allowing fine- 
2. CMT possible, or lethal threat? end 
3. Allowed in current mode, or lethal threat? c 11 d 
end 
tuning. 
4. Schedule CMT 
Note that when we select a CMT, we always 
prefer choosing a CMT that does not use 
manoeuvres, since manoeuvres often have 
negative influences on other CMTs (and 
perhaps on the flight plan). Only if there is 
no alternative, we choose the CMT 
containing a manoeuvre. If the operational 
mode constraint manoeuvring is active, we 
only choose the CMT containing the 
manoeuvre if the threat is lethal, even if there 
is no alternative. 
3.3 The scheduling process 
During the scheduling process, any event that 
may change the threat situation is handled to 
update the schedule of planned CMTs. There 
are several events that might change the 
schedule of planned CMTs: a new threat is 
detected, actors start to conflict, a CMT is 
finished, a threat has disappeared, an RCM is 
activated, or an actor has become available. 
We will describe the actions to undertake 
after each event below. 
New Threat Event 
When a new threat is detected, it depends on 
the availability of CMTs and actors what 
actions have to be undertaken. Essentially, 
-1 1- 
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the algorithm that is executed consists of four 
steps, and is depicted on the left. We will 
describe it below. 
Step 1 
Check if the new threat is countered by a 
RCM. If not, proceed to step 2. If it is, check 
whether there is a CMT that is expected to 
perform better. Is there no such CMT, then 
stop, else proceed to step 2. Note that when a 
conflict is present between the running RCM 
for countering threat A and a possible, better, 
CMT for countering A, we do not cancel the 
running RCM in favour of the CMT. Also 
note that the crew may have already 
countered the threat itself. In that case, 
selecting and scheduling a CMT may not be 
necessary. We do, however, not take this into 
account since we cannot know which threat 
the crew counters. 
Step 2 
Check whether at least one CMT is possible 
by looking at (1) the status of the actors, (2) 
possible conflicts with more important 
CMTs, (3) conflicts with crew-initiated CMs 
and (4) adverse effects. If after removing the 
impossible CMTs from the available CMTs 
to counter the threat, no CMT is left, and the 
threat is not lethal, then stop: no CMT is 
scheduled to counter the threat. Otherwise, 
proceed to step 3. 
Step 3 
If according to the operational mode, no 
CMT is allowed to execute, and the threat is 
not lethal, then stop: no CMT is scheduled. 
Otherwise, proceed to step 4. 
Step 4 
Here, we always schedule a CMT from the 
remaining list of possible CMTs. We prefer 
choosing a CMT in the following order: 
1. No manoeuvres; 
2. No negative influences on sensors; 
3. Highest effectiveness. 
In all four steps, CMTs containing 
manoeuvres are chosen only in the situation 
of a lethal threat. This is because manoeuvres 
usually have adverse effects on other CMTs 
and we do not want to interfere too much 
with the flying direction (e.g. mission 
planning, position with respect to other 
threats). 
When a manoeuvre is suggested, it is not 
checked whether the manoeuvre is actually 
performed. This is due to the following 
reasons: manoeuvres are only suggested 
when the TL is high and there are no other 
good options. Therefore, the manoeuvre is 
required: there is no alternative for the crew 
not following the advice. Furthermore, it is 
hard to check whether the crew is performing 
exactly the required the manoeuvre. 
Actor Conflict 
An actor conflict occurs when an actor does 
not work properly anymore, e.g., it is broken, 
empty (no more chaffs or flares) or when the 
crew is using the actor while being occupied 
by a CMT. 
All scheduled CMTs that require the actor in 
question are removed from the schedule. For 
the accompanying threats, new CMTs are 
selected. 
CMT Finished 
A CMT has finished regularly when all CMs 
of which it consists have finished regularly. 
The finished CMT is removed from the 
schedule. 
Threat Disappeared 
A threat can disappear. Either because of 
executed countermeasures (for instance: by 
the crew), or because an ambiguity has 
disappeared thanks to newly obtained sensor 
data, or for other, unknown, reasons. All 
CMTs, scheduled to counter the threat in 
question, are removed from the schedule. 
RCM Activated 
This event occurs when a software- 
implemented RCM is executed, based on the 
data in a raw sensor track. All CMTs, 
conflicting with the RCM, are removed. The 
accompanying threats are countered by other 
CMTs, if possible. 
-12- 
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Actor Available 
This occurs when the actor is released: the 
crew does not use it, no RCM uses it, and no 
CMT uses it (anymore). Taking action on 
this event is useful since we may have 
chosen a less effective CMT or no CMT at to 
counter threats. This is due to the fact that 
the actor needed to be used but was occupied 
at the selection time, or the CMT had an 
adverse effect on the actor. All threats, not 
being countered, are checked to see whether 
or not they can be countered now. All CMTs 
that have not started yet are considered to 
check whether a better CMT can be selected 
to counter the corresponding threat. 
4 The demonstration 
At the time of writing, a demonstration of the 
SPEW Manager is in preparation. The SPEW 
Manager implementation is embedded in the 
aforementioned ITEMS environment. 
ITEMS is a flexible software package that 
allows the user to generate a target-rich 
scenario without being limited to hard-coded 
sets of data. For our demonstration, ITEMS 
has been adapted to detail threat behaviour 
on countermeasures, and to obtain 
necessary" variables from the environment. 
The demonstration runs on Silicon Graphics 
workstations for the ITEMS part and on a 
SUN Ultra workstation for the SPEW 
Manager itself. Ethernet is used to 
communicate between them. 
Various scenarios will be run, both with an 
automated crew (in which a predefined flight 
path is flown and manoeuvre advice is 
automatically followed) and with human 
flight control. A very simple example of such 
a scenario is depicted in figure 5. There, 
ranges of threats do not overlap: no more 
than one threat has to be taken into account 
at the same time. 
FRIENDLY 
t=8 r 
\ 
\ 
/ 
I 
\M3 
150 NM 
\ 
\ 
\ 
* 
SAMl \ w 
IR2 
70 NM 
! .... ~ ........... . . ........................ .. ..: i: ........... ............................................................................................................... 
Figure 4. A simple scenario 
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The scenario consists of a threat theatre of 
150 x 180 miles in which a number of 
ground-based threats are displayed. Circles 
around the threats denote the range of the 
search radar, belonging to the threat. 
Hence, these also denote when the ownship 
can detect the threat. For this paper, the 
depicted ranges do not correspond to real 
threat types. 
The ownship in the depicted and a number 
of other scenarios is of the F-16 type. Next 
to F-16 (fighter) simulations, the feasibility 
of the SPEW Manager will also be tested 
using P3 Orion (surveillance) 
configurations. This involves a new set of 
actors to be loaded: the P3 Orion does not 
have as much countermeasures on-board, 
nor does it have the same manoeuvring 
capabilities as the F-16. P3 Orion 
simulations will prove the flexibility of our 
approach. 
5 Conclusions and future work 
Obviously, not too many conclusions can 
be drawn yet before the simulation results 
have been evaluated. However, we can see 
that the flexible design of the SPEW 
Manager, especially its configurability with 
respect to available actors and 
countermeasure techniques, results in a 
versatile and multi-platform electronic 
warfare improvement. 
It is expected that a SPEW Manager such as 
ours is the only way to facilitate 
countermeasure techniques to be applied 
that require exact timing of its individual 
countermeasures. The demonstration will 
show this. Additionally, a SPEW Manager 
like ours will allow us to develop new 
countermeasure techniques, requiring exact 
conditions on timing and positions. 
The way reflex countermeasures are fitted 
in show that our approach can take fighter 
hardware constraints, limitations and 
possibilities into account. The rules for 
selecting CMTs, kind of actors, and so on 
are easily configurable. This way, if an 
aircraft has other actors (or it concerns 
another aircraft), or if the rules are 
different, the SPEW Manager can still 
handle these new situations, without having 
to change the code. The modules that are 
configurable are the: 
CMT-rules; 
RCM-rules; 
Available actors including adverse 
effects on each other; 
A jammer is effective when the aspect 
angle is within a certain range, which can 
be specified in the (configurable) actor 
description. 
If in the future, other kinds of CMs are 
available (other than jammers, chaffs, flares 
and manoeuvres), new operational mode 
descriptions can be added easily as well. 
Future work includes developing and 
applying more advanced real-time 
scheduling algorithms that, combined with 
better short-time predictions of the 
situation, will improve the performance of 
our SPEW Manager even more. Next to the 
mentioned techniques, constraint 
satisfaction approaches [6] look very 
promising. 
Second, we will look at the possibility to 
include airborne threats, other than 
missiles. Essentially, these should fit in our 
approach without many problems. 
Third, we will experiment with the Human 
Machine Interface. What information has to 
be supplied to the crew, and how should it 
be displayed? One can for instance imagine 
various ways to display uncertainty and 
ambiguous information. 
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